An ambitious scientist dreams of overturning conventional wisdom and establishing a new paradigm that will provide a grand theoretical synthesis of the ®eld. This commentary examines the articles of this special issue to distinguish what might be new from what is deÂjaÁ vu to traditional, mainstream trait psychology. To accomplish this, the commentary begins with an exposition of how trait concepts are used in the natural sciences. This exposition is meant to correct a straw-man concept of traits, oered by some psychologists, as`unmodulated consistencies in . . . behavior across time and diverse situations ' (Kenrick and Funder, 1988, p. 24). After presenting an accurate view of the trait concept, I examine what the authors of these articles oer as alternatives to traits, traditionally conceived. This examination shows that the authors occasionally misrepresent traits, and that in some cases their oered alternatives are actually quite similar to traditional trait conceptions. I end by describing what the traditional trait approach considers to be reasonable goals for personality psychology and the most promising methods for reaching those goals. Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Personality traitsÐjust like the traits of physical substancesÐcan refer to appearance, behavior, or structure. Only a few personality traits (e.g. ectomorphic), refer to physical appearance. More often, personality traits refer to dispositions toward manifesting observable behaviors (e.g. attention seeking) or to nonobservable, inferred characteristics (e.g. need for approval). We might therefore learn some lessons about personality traits by re¯ecting upon how traits and situations are conceptualized in the physical sciences.
The most important lesson we might learn from the natural sciences concerns the fallacy of the endlessly repeated assertion that`Temporal stability and crosssituational consistency are considered prerequisites for the description of individuals in trait terms' (Steyer, Schmitt and Eid, 1999, p. 3) . In reality, only temporal stability is crucial to the trait concept. Behavioral consistency across dierent situations is not. To determine whether a substance is weakly or strongly ferromagnetic, for example, we do not require it to show behavioral consistency across a wide variety of situations. What we require is replicable behavior (magnetic attraction and becoming magnetized) in the same type of situation (a magnetic ®eld). This is temporal stability. Analogously, we can rightly attribute cooperativeness to a person who frequently (relative to some norm) shows the relevant behavior (compliance) in the relevant situation (reasonable requests) (Alston, 1975) . Mischel (1973) recognized that temporal stabilityÐnot consistency across dierent situationsÐis the hallmark of traits in the following passage:`But the fact that behavior varies across dierent situations is not questioned by anyone, including classical trait theorists. More serious issues, instead, are the consistency-speci®city with which the same person reacts to situations that ostensibly are relatively similar . . .' ( pp. 254±255, emphasis added). However, Mischel later downplayed temporal stability as something we all know and take for granted and redirected the person± situation debate back to the issue of cross-situational consistency (Mischel and Peake, 1982) .
It is true that physical materials possess certain structural (as opposed to behavioral) traits that exist in any situation. A magnetized iron bar retains its alignment of atoms wherever it ®nds itself; consequently, magnetized is, in a sense, à cross-situationally consistent' property of that iron bar. But that structural property will result in predictable patterns of observable behavior only in relevant situations (e.g. the presence of electromagnetic ®elds or other ferromagnetic objects). Likewise, traditional personality trait psychologists assume that persons possess motivational structures (e.g. goals, needs, motives, and values) that endure across diverse situations but that activate observable behavior only under the right circumstances (see Alston's (1975) discussion of purposive-cognitive concepts). Likewise, Mischel (1979, p. 742 ) is interested in`the pursuit of durable values and goals with stable skills and expectations for long periods of time'. Ultimately, for Allport (1937) and his followers, these enduring psychological structures exist because of enduring neurological structures.
Another lesson from the natural sciences concerns the speciousness of conceptualizing persons and situations as opposing forces whose relative powers can be compared. Water is often called`the universal solvent' because many substances dissolve in water. So, in a trivial sense, an aqueous environment could be called à powerful' situation. But closer examination shows that the power of water to dissolve anything depends just as much on the structural properties of the substance as on the properties of water. Chemists do not debate whether the atomic structure of salt or water is the more`powerful' force when salt dissolves in water. Thankfully, all of the articles in this special issue have heeded the good advice oered by Mischel (1973) ,`It would be wasteful to create pseudo-controversies that pit person against situation in order to see which is more important' ( pp. 255±256). Elsewhere (Johnson, 1999) , I argue that attribution theorists' ill conceived eorts to compare persons and situations as competing forces re¯ect personal rather than scienti®c concerns.
SITUATIONAL CONTEXT: OLD IDEA, NEW METHODS
The articles in this special issue all agree that personality research should consider the situational context of behavior. Each article then oers a speci®c method for doing so. I applaud these methodological innovations. But I also want to note that considering the situational context of behavior is an old idea in trait psychology rather than a reconceptualization of traits. In the traditional conception of personality traits, every trait incorporates, whether explicitly or implicitly, a situational context that literally helps to de®ne the trait.
1 While it is true that isolated trait words such as cooperative contain no explicit reference to the relevant context (reasonable requests), the context is tacitly built in to the socially shared meaning of the trait word. The situation-boundness of traits applies equally to so called`broad' or`global' traits as well as`narrow' traits. In Funder's (1991) words.
Every global trait is situation speci®c, in the sense that it is relevant to behavior in some ( perhaps many), but not all, life situations. Sociability is relevant only to behavior in situations with other people present, aggressiveness when there is the potential for interpersonal confrontation, friendliness when positive interaction is possible, and so forth. Our intuitions handle this sort of situational delimitation routinely and easily ( p. 36).
Recognizing that single trait words refer implicitly to situational contexts does not mean that we should allow contexts to remain implicit during personality assessment. I wholeheartedly endorse the suggestion of Van Mechelen and Kiers (1999) that,`One may wish to go beyond decontextualized approaches to personality and move to studies of individual dierences that include [explicit] references to speci®c contexts and speci®c behaviors ' ( p. 4) . I also agree with the proposal of Ten Berge and De Raad (1999) to have respondents generate situations that help to de®ne the personality traits we wish to assess. A respondent's view of the most relevant and prototypical situations (cf. Cantor, Mischel and Schwartz, 1982) for conceptualizing personality traits could be an interesting phenomenon in its own right, because understanding the tacit social rules underlying personality assessment is a form of social intelligence (Johnson, 1997a) .
THE CONDITIONAL`IF±THEN' QUALITY OF TRAITS
After reviewing the`causal view' and`summary view' of traits, which they claimed are both`unconditional conceptualizations of dispositional constructs' ( p. 1160), Wright and Mischel (1987) presented a conditional view of traits as`an alternative conceptualization of dispositional constructs' ( p. 1161). Following Wright and Mischel (1987) , several of the articles in this special issue espouse this conditional or if±then' view of personality traits as a conceptual advance over traditional views of personality traits. But the conditional quality of traits is not a new alternative, it is actually part of the causal view of traits described 50 years ago by Ryle (1949) and discussed by Alston (1975) and Wiggins (1974 Wiggins ( , 1997 . Wiggins presented Ryle's view of traits as causal dispositions as follows,`According to the dispositional view, when we say that John is aggressive, we are asserting that it is a good bet that in certain circumstances, John will behave aggressively. . . . The`good bet' (Ryle's words) indicates that the subjunctive conditional is probabilistic in form' ( p. 103). Ironically, proponents of the`if±then' conception of traits have consistently rejected traits as causal, explanatory mechanisms without realizing that Ryle's`if±then' statements were meant to attribute causal properties to persons (Wiggins, 1974 (Wiggins, , 1997 .
ARE NARROWER TRAITS`BETTER' THAN BROAD TRAITS?
In his own analysis of personality traits, philosopher William Alston (1975) noted that Mischel (1968 Mischel ( , 1973 , although recognizing that broad traits have some utility, clearly favored narrow traits over broad traits and dynamic traits over descriptive traits. Several authors of articles in this special issue also seem to favor narrower traits. Do narrower traits in fact have any distinct advantages over broader traits?
The standard response to this question is to note the bandwidth/®delity tradeo (Cronbach and Gleser, 1957) . This tradeo says that, in theory, broad bandwidth traits are supposed to predict a wide range of criteria with modest accuracy (low ®delity), whilst narrow bandwidth traits are supposed to predict a more limited range of criteria with greater accuracy (high ®delity). The bandwidth/®delity tradeo is widely cited and accepted, particularly in personnel psychology (Buss, 1989; Hampson et al., 1986; Hogan et al., 1996) . But is it really the case that the strongest associations are always between broad predictors and broad criteria and between narrow predictors and narrow criteria?
2 Alston (1975) noted that behavioral traits can be broad or narrow in two senses (see also Moskowitz, 1982) . First, trait breadth can refer to the number of distinct acts subsumed by the trait category. In this regard, Hampson, John and Goldberg (1986) and John, Hampson and Goldberg (1991) note that the category of potential warm or kind acts is broader than the category of charitable acts. Stated dierently, there are more ways to be warm or kind than charitable. A second sense of trait breadth refers to the number of distinct, relevant situations subsumed by the trait category. For example, rule-abiding is as broad as the number of sets of rules one can identify; abiding by one's church's rules is a narrower trait. Hostile toward authority ®gures includes a potentially wide range of authority ®gures; hostile toward parents is a narrower trait.
The two senses of trait breadth are often mixed indiscriminately in discussions. Among the eight dierent situations' in the Carleton study (Shoda, 1999) we ®nd three types of act subsumed by the conscientiousness category: neatness, punctuality and completion. Punctuality is broken down further into schoolwork punctuality (three assignments, two readings, and two study reports) and attendance punctuality (in a one-on-one situationÐseven appointmentsÐand in a group situationÐfour lectures). Completion refers to two assessments of readings completed and three assessments of percent of studies completed. Shoda (1999) , in mathematically elegant fashion, shows that the bandwidth/®delity tradeo (although he does not recognize the phenomenon by that label) is slightly more complicated than most accounts indicate. Shoda demonstrates ®rst that aggregate (i.e. broad bandwidth) predictors actually predict unaggregated (narrow bandwidth) criteria better than unaggregated (narrow) predictors if the criterion is not part of the aggregate predictor. On the other hand, if the criterion is part of the aggregate predictor, there is a tradeo between reduced error variance and masked, situation-speci®c information. As person by situation interaction variance increases, aggregation ( predictor breadth) becomes a liability rather than a boon, at which point narrow criteria are better predicted by narrow traits than broad traits.
3 Shoda (1999) next demonstrates that the ability of an aggregate (broad bandwidth) predictor to predict an aggregate (broad bandwidth) criterion (based on components that do not overlap with the predictor's components) increases as the number of components within each aggregate increases. So, the traditional view that`broad best predicts broad' is true, and, in fact, the broader, the better. However, while presenting his novel insights with his excellent, mathematically parsimonious model, Shoda neglects to mention an important requirement: All components must be conceptually relevant to the same broad, superordinate personality trait (see Epstein, 1983 , footnote 1). Adding components from irrelevant situations to increase breadth will not increase predictive accuracy. It seems to me that personality researchers too often fail to heed an admonition from Gardner Murphy (1967) . Murphy warned that mathematics can lead us into`various types of mysticism which become so fascinating, so enriching, and so sustaining that one ®nds it dicult indeed to come back to the world of plain things and the immediate world to be dealt with' ( p. 428). Although I appreciate in particular the formal models in these articles that recapture meaningful variance from what was formerly considered error variance, I do worry about formalisms becoming the center of attention rather than a tool for representing personality concepts. Shoda (1999) , Van Mechelen and Kiers (1999) , and Vansteelandt (1999) all suggest two further advantages for narrow traits over broad traits. First, they ®nd that narrow traits provide more complete, dierentiated information about individual persons. Second, they perceive narrow traits to provide a clearer route to personality dynamics. I shall next consider the alleged descriptive superiority of narrow traits and then examine the links to, and merits of, dynamic-trait conceptions of personality.
PROFILE PATTERNS AND PERSON RELIABILITY
One of Shoda's conclusions from his data analyses is that the average temporal stability of r 0.275 for the eight separate`situations' masks dierences in stability 3 One might ask, in passing,`Who wants to predict narrow criteria, particularly single acts?'. According to Hogan (1998) , traditional personality measurement seeks only to predict signi®cant, broad life outcomes such as vocational choices and job performance.`Predicting these consequential outcomes should be contrasted with trying to predict a person's actions on a single occasionÐwhether you were early or late to work last Wednesday. That problem is intellectually uninteresting and a psychometric fool's errand' ( p. 4). Elsewhere, he says,`We rarely want to predict how late an employee will be next Tuesday; rather, we are interested in a person's punctuality. To predict punctualityÐa broad bandwidth behavioral characteristicÐwe need constructs of the same bandwidth (i.e. personality dispositions)' (Hogan et al., 1996, p. 473) .
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447 coecients for these`situations'. For example, one individual might show consistently extreme neatness over time, but an inconsistent record of completion, whereas another individual might show the opposite pattern. Shoda refers to the pro®le representing the relative stabilities of trait subcategories as a person's`behavioral signature'. One can hardly argue against the view that a set of scores for a person on narrow traits provides a more dierentiated view of that person than an overall score on a superordinate trait. This is true by de®nition. But is Shoda's notion of a`behavioral signature' a conceptual advance in personality assessment? Pro®ling in personality assessment, which dates back to the earliest multi-scale inventories, is certainly nothing new. Neither is pro®ling the subdomains of a broader trait domain, which is done routinely for inventories such as the NEO-PI-R . Neither is the notion of assessing the reliability of an individual pro®le of scores (Jackson, 1976) . Neither is computing the stability of pro®les based on observer's assessment of single items; Block (1971) has done this using the California Q-set. Is there anything unique and progressive about Shoda's behavioral signatures?
The unique feature of the`behavioral signature' as presented by Shoda (1999) may, unfortunately, be a weakening rather than an improvement over standard personality pro®ling. Each point in a standard personality pro®le represents an aggregate score. On self-report inventories these aggregates are built from responses to multiple items. Even for Q-set pro®les, where each point represents one item, the items themselves are aggregate judgements of traits. In contrast, the points in the behavioral pro®les oered by Shoda (1999) represent single behavioral acts. From the viewpoint of standard psychometrics, claiming that these pro®les represent stable patterns of stability and instability to dierent situations is highly speculative. In an earlier article on behavioral pro®ling, Shoda, Mischel and Wright (1994) required a minimum of six observations per point in a pro®le. Even six observations may be too few to assess the tendency of a behavioral disposition to manifest itself in a particular situation. The following analogy between baseball batting averages and personality trait scores illustrates why this is so.
Baseball batting averages, like individuals' location on broad personality trait dimensions, summarize long-term trends in behavior over time and relevant situations (cf. Abelson, 1985) . Just as broad personality trait scores can be split into narrower component trait scores, baseball averages can be decomposed into averages within dierent batting situations. For example, a baseball player who bats 0.350 (hits safely in 35 out of every 100 ocial at-bats) might hit 0.330 against left-handed pitchers and 0.370 against right-handed pitchers. Baseball statisticians routinely keep track of players' averages in a variety of batting situations, such as day versus night games, real versus arti®cial turf, and whether or not runners are in scoring position. If one wanted to compile very narrow, highly dierentiated batting averages, one could calculate the averages for a combination of these situations, for example, a player's average against left-handed pitchers during day games on natural grass with a runner on third base. But, clearly, our faith in such a highly dierentiated batting average depends on the number of observations we have for this speci®c situation.
My assessment, therefore, of the behavioral pro®ling of relatively narrow traits is that these pro®les can indeed give us valuable, ®ne-grained portraits of individuals, but that the points in these pro®les should be based on a sucient number of observations before they can be reasonably interpreted. Current presentations of `behavioral pro®ling' worry me in that they sometimes represent a retrograde practice of de®ning personality consistency with pairs of isolated acts.
THE BRIDGE FROM DESCRIPTIVE TO DYNAMIC TRAITS
Van Mechelen and De Raad (1999) rightly note that synthetic, integrative thinking on the person±situation debate requires linking descriptive, dispositional traits to explanatory, dynamic traits. Shoda (1999) , Van Mechelen and Kiers (1999) , and Vansteelandt (1999) believe that this link is to be found between narrow traits and the Cognitive±Aective Personality System (CAPS; Shoda, 1995, 1998) conception of personality dynamics. Like Weimer (1984) , I appreciate and applaud any attempt to integrate descriptive and causal discourse in personality psychology. Nonetheless, I ®nd that the current integrative eorts fall short of a uni®ed theory for four reasons.
First, I see no compelling theoretical reasons why narrow traits should be closer than broad traits to explanatory, dynamic traits. In fact, Funder (1991) and McCrae and Costa (1995) describe senses in which broad (global) traits can be explanatory. Second, none of the current articles empirically demonstrates that variables in the CAPS model show stronger associations with narrow, situation-speci®c traits than with broad traits. Third, the current articles fail to recognize that ordinary trait terms often refer to underlying, dynamic traits as well as observable behavior traits (Johnson, 1997b) . Thus,`sociable' can refer to a need, desire, or longing for social contact or to a behavior pattern of frequent socializing. Conceivably, one could develop assessment instruments that measure either the dynamic or behavioral sense of a trait, although most existing scales probably confound the two. For example, in the article of Van Mechelen and Kiers (1999) , the`Values' items possibly measure some unknown combination of values per se plus patterns of valued behavior.
The fourth shortcoming of the present integrative eorts is with the CAPS model itself. Alston (1975, p. 29 , footnote 2) points out that the variables in the CAPS model are precisely the types of concept used in perfectly ordinary, common-sense explanations of intentional actions. Common-sense explanations use desires, beliefs, and abilities to explain actions (Malle, 1999) . In a common-sense explanation, an act is explained by suggesting that the actor (a) desired a certain goal, (b) believed that the action would help him/her reach the goal, and (c) had the ability to perform the act. At any point in time, a person has a number of desired goals that may con¯ict with each other and may possess several beliefs about alternative routes for reaching these goals. How a person actually behaves depends on the particular desires and beliefs that enter awareness and on relative strengths of various desires. Cheek and Buss (1981) show, for example, that the eect of sociability (in the dynamic sense of a preference or desire for social contact) on actual social behavior depends on another aective trait, shyness ( feelings of tension, awkwardness, and discomfort around others).
One limitation of the CAPS model is its failure to advance our scienti®c understanding of personality dynamics beyond how we already understand human action from common sense. As far as I can tell, the labeling and re-labeling of desires, beliefs, and abilities has simply re¯ected the psychological jargon popular at that point in history (Funder, 1991, p. 31) . CAPS originated (Mischel, 1973) 
as an S3[O]3R
Old wine in new bottles 449 model advocated by social learning behaviorists in the 1960s, which explains the model's original label`subjective-stimulus values' for desires. Likewise,`stimulusoutcome expectancies' and`behavior-outcome expectancies' re¯ect classical conditioning and operant condition terminology, respectively, for beliefs about the events expected to follow other events. Over time, the`re®nement' of the CAPS model has consisted of incorporating the psychological jargon du jour (e.g. cognitive heuristics, schemas, prototypes, ecacy, aects, goals). I am surprised and somewhat depressed about the enthusiasm for the CAPS model, but not because the model is wrong. The problem is that settling for this model indicates that we are content to merely re-label common sense concepts with jargon, as opposed to developing a truly scienti®c model of personality dynamics.
PRIMROSE PATHS BETTER NOT TAKEN
I would like to enter one ®nal concern about the overriding research goals represented by following the CAPS model and narrowing our focus on increasingly speci®c situations. These practices indicate that`predictions about the individual's probable behavior in speci®c situations' (Mischel, 1979, p. 743 ) is an attainable research goal. Like Hogan (1998) , I think this goal is unrealistic. Here is why.
To know what an individual person will do on one occasion in a speci®c situation, a psychologist would have to have instantaneous access to the state of the person's mind across all of the activated cognitive±aective units (encodings, expectancies, goals, etc) . This is because the immediate, proximal cause of behavior on a single occasion is, as Steyer et al. (1999) point out, the person's current state of mind. (Personality traits, in contrast, represent more remote, distal causes of behaviorÐMcCrae and Costa, 1995.) I see no technology in any of these articles (or even on the horizon) for assessing an individual's psychological state at one point in time. The CAPS scale oered by Van Mechelen and Kiers (1999) assesses trait rather than state levels on the CAPS variables, and none of the mathematical manipulations in the other articles assess the state of individuals' minds. I think a more reasonable, achievable goal would be to develop better measures of traits as traditionally conceived (i.e. both descriptive and dynamic traits) to forecast broad patterns of the life course.
REASONABLE GOALS AND PATHS FOR PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY
Narrowing our focus toward speci®c behaviors on speci®c occasions seems to me the wrong direction for personality psychology. There is nothing inherently wrong in studying narrow traits, so long as adequate measurement reliability is achieved. Furthermore, making explicit the situational context for traits is a worthwhile goal. But narrow, limited domain approaches will not lead us to comprehensive, integrative models of personality. I conclude by suggesting what I regard as promising future directions for personality research.
For those so inclined, a widely accepted, comprehensive taxonomy of situations remains to be constructed. Ten Berge and De Raad (1999) review a number of proposed taxonomies, but none of these enjoys the level of acceptance of the FiveFactor Model of traits. Perhaps one of the problems is researchers' failure to use the same kind of descriptive unit for traits and situations. One exception, overlooked in the review of Ten Berge and De Raad is Holland's (1985) taxonomy of personality types and environments. By using the same language (e.g. artistic) to describe persons and environments, Holland's system embodies the insight that the most important feature of situations is the type of person found in that situation (Shoda, Mischel and Wright, 1993) .
Another suggestion for movement toward a comprehensive model of personality is to focus primarily on traits that possess evolutionary signi®cance for all of humankind (e.g. the disposition to experience jealousyÐBuss, Larsen, Western and Semmelroth, 1992) . Traits that re¯ect the specialized research interests of academic psychologists (e.g. ego control, need for cognition, hostile attribution style) may represent important scienti®c advances over the common sense traits found in natural languages. But because these technical constructs are inventions of scienti®c imagination, I wonder about their range of applicability in a comprehensive model of personality.
Finally, I think our discipline will make more progress when we understand that all forms of psychological assessment (even self-reports) represent social situations (Johnson, 1997a) . A better understanding of the cognitive, motivational, and social dynamics of personality assessment will provide an important integration between the long-separated areas of personality theory and personality assessment.
